He considers that grasping might be a modal sense or ability that allows the understander to, over and above registering how things are. ), Epistemic Value. Her line is that understanding-why involves (i) knowing what something is, and (ii) making reasonable sense of it. Attempts to explain away the intuitions suggesting that lucky understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck. On such a view, grasping talk could simply be jettisoned altogether. This is because we dont learn about causes a priori. Divides recent views of understanding according to whether they are manipulationist or explanationst; argues for a different view according to which understanding is maximally well-connected knowledge. Discusses whether intellectualist arguments for reducing know-how to propositional knowledge might also apply to understanding-why (if it is a type of knowing how). epistemological shift pros and cons - hashootrust.org.pk Contains the famous counterexamples to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. Uses the hypothesis of extended cognition to argue that understanding can be located (at least partly) outside the head. Argues that requiring knowledge of an explanation is too strong a condition on understanding-why. Even so, and especially over the past decade, there has been agreement amongst most epistemologists working on epistemic value that that understanding is particularly valuable (though see Janvid 2012 for a rare dissenting voice). Pritchard (2007) has put forward some ideas that may prevent the need to adopt a weak view of understandings factivity while nonetheless maintaining the key thrust of Elgins insight. As such, his commentary here is particularly relevant to the question of whether gasping is factive. Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx - Running head: SHIFT IN To the extent that such a move is available, one has reason to resist Morriss rationale for resisting Pritchards diagnosis of Kvanvigs case. In addition, it is important to make explicit differences in terminology that can sometimes confuse discussions of some types of understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Grimm, S. Understanding as Knowledge of Causes in A. Fairweather (ed. Understanding in Epistemology | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. manage list views salesforce. If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. How should we distinguish between peripheral beliefs about a subject matter and beliefs that are not properly, Understanding entails true beliefs of the form. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. However, it is not entirely clear that extant views on understanding fall so squarely into these two camps. But it is not strictly true. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift. Social Sciences - EssayZoo For a less concessionary critique of Kvanvigs Comanche case, however, see Grimm (2006). Whitcomb, D. Wisdom. In S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard (eds. This is because we might be tempted to say instead that we desire to make sense of things because it is good to do so rather than saying that it is good to make sense of things because we desire it. Pragmatism as an epistemological approach accentuates the reasoning of theories and concepts by studying their consequences and goals, values and interests they support. epistemological shift pros and cons - singhaniatabletting.in However, Pritchard (2014) responds to Grimms latest proposal with a number of criticisms. The Myth of Factive Verbs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80:3 (2010): 497-522. In this sense, the history of thought can be seen as the sometimes imperceptibly fluid, sometimes bizarre and abrupt, movements of our concepts. ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). That said, Grimms more recent work (2014) expands on these earlier observations to form the basis of a view that spells out grasping in terms of a modal relationship between properties, objects or entitiesa theory on which what is grasped when one has understanding-why will be how changes in one would lead (or fail to lead) to changes in the other. He argues that what is grasped or seen when one attains a priori knowledge is not a proposition but a certain modal relationship between properties, objects or identities. Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology. Ethics 120 (2009): 94-127. It should be noted that Hills 2009: 7 is also sympathetic to a similar thought, suggesting that the threshold for understanding might be contextually determined. In the first version, we are to imagine that the agent gets her beliefs from a faux-academic book filled with mere rumors that turn out to be luckily true. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Since what Grimm is calling subjective understanding (that is, Riggss intelligibility) is by stipulation essentially not factive, the question of the factivity of subjective understanding simply does not arise. Though the demandingness of this ability need not be held fixed across practical circumstances. Open Document. Secondly, there is plenty of scope for understanding to play a more significant role in social epistemology. One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why. Such a theory raises questions of its own, such as precisely what answering reliably, in the relevant sense, demands. This is explained in the following way: If it is central to ordinary cognitive function that one is motivated to pursue X, then X has value in virtue of its place in this functional story. Regarding the comparison between the value of understanding and the value of knowledge, then, he will say that if understanding is fundamental to curiosity then this provides at least a partial explanation for why it is superior to the value of knowledge. If Hills is right about this connection between grasping and possessing abilities, it might seem as though understanding-why is, at the end of the day, very similar to knowing-how (see, however, Sullivan 2017 for resistance to this suggestion).. How should an account of objectual understanding incorporate these types of observationsnamely, where the falsity of a central belief or central beliefs appears compatible with the retention of some degree of understanding? Hills thinks that mere propositional knowledge does not essentially involve any of these abilities even if (as per the point above) propositional knowledge requires other kinds of abilities. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. This broader interpretation seems well positioned to handle abstract object cases, for example, mathematical understanding, when the kind of understanding at issue is understanding-why. Achievements are thought of as being intrinsically good, though the existence of evil achievements (for example, skillfully committing genocide) and trivial achievements (for example, competently counting the blades of grass on a lawn) shows that we are thinking of successes that have distinctive value as achievements (Pritchard 2010: 30) rather than successes that have all-things-considered value. Kelps account, then, explains our attributions of degrees of understanding in terms of approximations to such well-connected knowledge. Argues that the ordinary concept of knowledge is not factive and that epistemologists should therefore not concern themselves with said ordinary concept. Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay Finally, there is fruitful work to do concerning the relationship between understanding and wisdom. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. In other words, S knows that p only if p is true. In addition, the weak view leaves it open that two agents might count as understanding some subject matter equally well in spite of the fact that for every relevant belief that one has, the other agent maintains its denial. With these three types of understanding in mindpropositional understanding, understanding-why and objectual understandingthe next section considers some of the key questions that arise when one attempts to think about when, and under what conditions, understanding should be ascribed to epistemic agents. Description Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. London: Continuum, 2012. ), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. If the latterthat is, if we are to understand grasping literally, then, also unfortunately, we are rarely given concrete details of its nature. Morris suggests that the writer of the Comanche book might lack understanding due to failing to endorse the relevant propositions, while the reader might have understanding because she does endorse the relevant proposition. ), The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. See Elgin (2004) for some further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her account. Elgin (2007), like Zagzebski, is sympathetic to a weak factivity constraint on objectual understanding, where the object of understanding is construed as a fairly comprehensive, coherent body of information (2007: 35). Although many chapters take as their starting point an analysis of how dominant political, educational, and musical ideologies serve to construct and sustain inequities and undemocratic practices, authors also identify practices that seek to promote socially just pedagogy and approaches to music education. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Finally, Section 6 proposes various potential avenues for future research, with an eye towards anticipating how considerations relating to understanding might shed light on a range of live debates elsewhere in epistemology and in philosophy more generally. So the kind of knowledge that it provides is metaknowledgeknowledge about knowledge. Morris, K. A Defense of Lucky Understanding. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (2012): 357-371. Grimm (2011) calls this subjective understanding. He describes subjective understanding as being merely a grasp of how specific propositions interlinkone that does not depend on their truth but rather on their forming a coherent picture. Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. See further Bradford (2013; 2015) for resistance to the very suggestion that there can be weak achievements on Pritchards sensenamely, achievements that do not necessarily involve great effort, regardless of whether they are primarily due to ability. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. Elgin, C. Exemplification, Idealization, and Understanding in M. Surez (ed. Must they be known or can they be Gettiered true beliefs? Perhaps the strongest of these is his suggestion that while the faculty of rational insight is indispensable to the grasping account of a priori, it is actually essential to knowledge of causes that it not be grasped through rational insight. While we would apply a description of better understanding to agent A even if the major difference between her and agent B was that A had additional true beliefs, we would also describe A as having better understanding than B if the key difference was that A had fewer false beliefs. This is not so obvious, and at least, not as obvious as it is in the case of knowledge. Pritchard, D. Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008): 325-39. In terms of parallels with the understanding debate, it is important to note that the knowledge of causes formula is not limited to the traditional propositional reading. Argues against compatibility between understanding and epistemic luck. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (Vol. Relatedly, Van Camp (2014) calls understanding a higher level cognition that involves recognizing connections between different pieces of knowledge, and Kosso (2007: 1) submits that inter-theoretic coherence is the hallmark of understanding, stating knowledge of many facts does not amount to understanding unless one also has a sense of how the facts fit together. While such remarks are made with objectual understanding (that is, understanding of a subject matter) in mind, there are similar comments about understanding-why (for example, Hills 2009) that suggest an overlapping need to consider connections between items of information, albeit on a smaller scale. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005. Her key thought here is that grasping the truth can actually impede the chances of ones attaining understanding because such a grasp might come at too high a cognitive cost. Pros and cons of the epistemological shift - Ideal Term Papers Rohwer, Y. For one thing, abstract objects, such as mathematical truths and other atemporal phenomena, can plausibly be understood even though our understanding of them does not seem to require an appreciation of their coming to existence. We can accommodate the thought that not all beliefs relevant to an agents understanding must be true while nonetheless insisting that cases in which false beliefs run rampant will not count as understanding. On the weakest view, one can understand a subject matter even if none of ones beliefs about that subject matter are true. ), Justification and Knowledge. and claims that this goes along with a shift away from studying the cognitive subject's conceptual grasp of objects towards a "reflection on the . That said, for manipulationists who are not already inclined to accept the entailment from all-knowing to omni-understanding, the efficacy against the manipulationist is diffused as the example does not get off the ground. Sullivan, E. Understanding: Not Know-How. Philosohpical Studies (2017). Specifically, he takes his opponents view to be that knowledge through direct experience is what sates curiosity, a view that traces to Aristotle. That is, we often describe an individual as having a better understanding of a subject matter than some other person, perhaps when choosing whom to approach for advice or when looking for someone to teach us about a subject. Includes Alstons view of curiosity, according to which the epistemic value of true belief and knowledge partially comes from a link to curiosity. Some (for example, Gordon 2012) suggest that attributions of propositional understanding typically involve attributes of propositional knowledge or a more comprehensive type of understandingunderstanding-why, or objectual understanding (these types are examined more closely below).